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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine Malaysia’s diplomatic relations with Syria through 
three periods: pre-Mahathir era, the first phase of Mahathir era (1981-2003) and the ‘inter-
Mahathir’ years (2003-2018) - referring to the period prior to the return of Mahathir as 
Prime Minister for the second time in 2018. Ultimately, this study attempts to identify the key 
factors determining the nature of Malaysia’s bilateral ties with Syria during the Mahathir 
era. The methodology adopted for this study is qualitative in nature, relying on primary and 
secondary sources, the former being personal interviews conducted with Tun Dr. Mahathir 
himself and also with scholars in the field. This paper argues that during the pre-Mahathir 
era (1958-1981), relations with Syria were very much based on political and diplomatic 
considerations. However, during the Mahathir era (1981-2003) the emphasis changed due 
to the significant economic development and Malaysia’s foreign policy took a much more 
global approach. With this change, economic factors as a foreign policy determinant became 
more prominent as compared to the pre-Mahathir period. The inter-Mahathir years (2003-
2018) did not witness any significant development except for the humanitarian support 
extended by the Malaysian government during the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011.  
Keywords: Malaysian Foreign Policy, Syria, Middle East, Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), Islamic State or Daesh.  
Introduction
Diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Syria was first established in 1958 and it has been 
maintained for the last 60 years until today. The objective of this study is to identify the key 
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factors determining Malaysia’s bilateral ties with Syria. In particular, this paper investigates 
the dynamics of Malaysia-Syria relations and the factors which determined Malaysia’s 
policy towards Syria during three specific eras: the pre-Mahathir years, the Mahathir era, 
and finally, during the inter-Mahathir period. Prior to Malaysia’s independence, contacts 
had already been established between the Arabs and the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula. 
It was the Muslim traders from the Middle East who contributed to the birth of Islam in 
Malaya (Ruhanas, 2009: 29). The growth of Islam also saw the Malays traveling to the 
Middle East for pilgrimage, as well as to pursue religious studies.  Ever since independence, 
Malaysia has pursued a special interest towards the region, which was driven initially by 
religious variables, but soon as a result of political and economic reasons (Nair, 1997: 3). 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Malaysia-Syria relations since independence 
especially during the Mahathir administration and the factors that influenced Malaysia’s 
engagement with Syria.   
Existing literature on Malaysia’s foreign relations is usually studied by examining namely, 
defence and security, development and trade, international cooperation and diplomacy. 
The works referred to are Saravanamuttu (1983), Saravanamuttu (2010), Jeshurun (2008), 
Karim (1990), Ruhanas (2006), Baginda (2007), Mohd Azizuddin (2012), and Azhari 
Karim (2013). In addition, this study also refers to Kaminder’s (2011) study which 
provides a comprehensive discussion on Malaysia’s external policy during the Mahathir 
administration whereby he argues that Malaysia’s foreign relations is not entirely determined 
by idiosyncrasies, but rather, domestic and external factors. Finally, works by scholars who 
have analysed Malaysia’s relations with Islamic countries - Nair (1997), Ruhanas (2009), 
Redzuan (2006), Sidin (2000), Asmady (2013), Asmady (2012) and Muhammad (1999) 
and the role of Islam in fostering diplomatic ties with fellow Islamic countries, especially 
the Middle East, will also be considered for the investigation of Malaysia’s relations with 
Syria during the three different phases. This article intends to fill the lacunae in the existing 
literature on Malaysia-Syria relations by previous scholars. It also highlights factors that 
have influenced Malaysia-Syria relations throughout the periods under study. 
Brief Background of Syria
In order to better understand Malaysia’s bilateral relations with Syria, it is necessary to provide 
a brief description of the political background of Syria. This will enable us to appreciate the 
achieved its independence in 1957, Syria had become a free nation one decade earlier, in 
1946.  However, Syria as an entity has been in existence for many centuries with Damascus 
being one of the oldest cities in the world with continuous inhabitants. It had undergone 
numerous political changes throughout its long history, from being part of earlier empires, 
including the Byzantine around the 4th century, and later becoming part of the Islamic world. 
Damascus became the centre of the Umayyad Caliphate beginning with Muawiyya, and 
Syria became an important state within the broader Islamic expansion, including during the 
rule of the subsequent Abbasid Empire. After the fall of the Abbasid Empire in 1258, Syria 
came under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The subsequent fall of the latter in 1918 
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saw Syria being under British control for a brief period. However, as a result of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement in 1922, it then became part of the French mandate (Rogan, 2009:11). It 
was only in 1946, after the Second World War, that France agreed to transfer control of the 
military and security forces to the independent government of Syria.  
Syria’s foreign policy after its independence was driven by its pan-Arabism ideals which 
were soon translated into a political union with Egypt - with both countries having strong 
stance against Israel. Externally, Syria was committed to confront Israel as part of its 
regional role and position. Apart from sharing a common border with Israel, Damascus saw 
itself as being part of the wider Arab resistance against Zionism. However, it also realised 
that it needed other countries in the region in order to be part of a larger coalition against 
Israel. Hence, the idea of a political union was actually pushed by the Syrians (Drysdarle, 
1991: 61) which led to both countries declaring the formation of the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) in February 1958.
The direct consequence of Malaysia’s interest in Egypt was what brought Syria directly 
to Malaysia’s interests. As the UAR was a union rather than a mere alliance treaty, it was 
inevitable that Malaysia had to establish direct relations with Syria even though it did not 
have any real interests to do so at that particular point in time. In other words, when the 
UAR was formed, Kuala Lumpur had to establish relations with Syria as that would be the 
path to take to make it in line with its foreign policy with Egypt. Thus, Malaysia’s initial 
relations with Syria have to be examined within the context of Egypt and the formation of 
the UAR (Mohd. Ridzaun Devan Abdullah personal communication, October, 31, 2015). 
As Egypt was seen as the most significant Middle East country in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
bilateral ties with Cairo affected much of Malaysia’s policy towards the Middle East.   
Malaysia-Syria Ties: The Pre-Mahathir Era (1958-1981)
It is noteworthy that even though Malaysia had established formal ties with Syria, it did 
not have any direct diplomatic representatives in Damascus initially. This was mainly due 
to the lack of financial and manpower resources. Being a country which only gained its 
independence in 1957, Malaysia had very limited resources to establish missions in every 
country it had official ties with. According to the memoirs of Ahmad Kamil Jaafar, a 
former Secretary General of Wisma Putra who served in the domestic service before being 
transferred to foreign service, in the early 1960s, “Compared to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the Ministry of External Affairs was a small world with not more than a dozen diplomatic 
officers attached to a few divisions – political and information, consular and immigration, 
administration and financial, and protocol” (Kamal, 2013). The main diplomatic priorities 
would be the countries with which Malaya had strong traditional ties namely, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, among others. 
In addition, the unity of the UAR was short lived when Egypt and Syria parted ways in 
1961. The departure of Syria from its political union with Egypt had influenced the degree of 
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importance that Kuala Lumpur placed on Syria thereafter. This was very much so especially, 
during the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (of 1963 to 1966), when Syria had sided with 
Jakarta, much to the disappointment of Kuala Lumpur (Ruhanas, 2009).  According to a 
former senior Malaysian diplomat, “due to the influence of the Indonesian communists, the 
Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI), on their Syrian counterparts, which were themselves strong 
within Syrian politics, Damascus was against Malaysia and supported the Indonesian case. 
This was in contrast with many other Middle Eastern countries that supported Malaysia 
instead” (Khatib, personal communication, April, 5, 2016).  
Trade and economic ties between Malaysia and Syria during this era were basic and 
remained small. This was due mainly to the lack of any real interests by both parties to 
develop any meaningful economic relationship. This lack of interest also stemmed from 
the limited number of products or goods that could be traded, either for import or export 
purposes. (Please refer to Tables 1 and 1.1). 
Table 1  
Main Imports from the UAR 
Egypt ($ Million)
Commodity 1958   1959
Potatoes (except sweet potatoes) 0.02   0.49
Onions 0.04   0.04
Chick pea and gram -   0.02
Garlic fresh -   0.07
Fruits and nuts fresh 0.08   0.10
Miscellaneous 0.03   0.03
Total 0.17   1.11
Syria ($ Million)
Onions -   2.843
Total -   2.843
Source: Federation of Malaya, Statistics of Internal Trade SR (080) 206/3/1-1, 26 November 1960
The Mahathir Influence and the Changing Phases of  Malaysia-Syria Diplomatic Relations
39
Table 1.1  
Main Exports to the UAR
Egypt ($ Million)
Commodity 1958   1959
Rubber 0.30   0.46
Coconut oil 0.72   0.04
Canned Pineapples   -   0.02
Miscellaneous   -     -
Total 1.02   0.52
Syria ($ Million)
Rubber 0.10   0.06
Tin 0.15   0.03
Timber 0.01   0.01
Total 0.26   0.10
Source: Federation of Malaya, Statistics of External Trade SR (080) 206/3/1-1
Nonetheless, in an effort to step up economic and trade relations between Malaysia and 
Syria, in May 1969, the Malaysian government proposed to concurrently accredit Mr 
Mustapha Haji Mohamad, who was its Trade Representative in Lebanon, to cover Syria as 
well. He was to reside in Beirut “from where he is expected to make frequent trips to Syria. 
Kuala Lumpur therefore, formally requested for this concurrent accreditation of Mustapha 
to Syria as Malaysia’s Trade Representative” (Embassy of Malaysia, May 17, 1969).
Table 1.2 






















Source: Department of Statistics (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer) various reports.
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Source: Department of Statistics (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer) various reports.
It is interesting to note that Malaysian imports from Syria prior to the Mahathir administration 
was limited as shown in Table 1.2. For example, in 1957 the imports from Syria were 
merely USD1,200, and it never reached beyond USD1 million. Highest import value was 
USD544,191 in 1978 (Table 1.3). This was due to the lack of interests in Syrian products 
among Malaysians compared to goods such as dates, perfumes and Islamic religious 
materials produced by Saudi Arabia and Egypt which Malaysians were more familiar with 
compared to products from Syria.
Malaysian exports to Syria however (Table 1.2 and 1.3), had been consistently higher than 
its imports from Syria. This was due to the fact that Malaysia had been one of the major 
producers of rubber and tin which were crucial commodities for the Syrian economy. 
Initially, Malaysia’s exports to Syria in 1957 was USD1,334,547, however it dropped 
in the mid-1960s due to political differences between the two countries especially when 
Syria demonstrated its support for Indonesia during the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation. 
However, by the 1970s, when Malaysia adopted a more neutral foreign policy, trade relations 
between Malaysia and Syria improved. Exports to Syria increased from USD584,743 in 
1974, to USD2,572,626 in 1975. The export value from Malaysia to Syria continued to 
increase in the next five years, reaching USD13,600,000 in 1980. This demonstrated the 
ever increasing demand for commodities such as rubber and tin from Malaysia from the 
Syrian population.
Essentially, relations between Malaysia and Syria faced a number of challenges, namely, 
the lack of resources in terms of budget, as well as personnel. As stated earlier, it was the 
political variable that mainly shaped Kuala Lumpur’s attitude towards Damascus. Malaysia 
viewed Syria primarily from the perspective of its ties with Egypt, in the context of the 
formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958. However, when Damascus left the union in 
1961, Kuala Lumpur’s ties with Syria did not see any significant development, except for 
maintaining existing limited economic relations, as well as cultural ties. 
In spite of the limited relations, Malaysia has always been supportive of Syria within the 
context of the Middle East, namely, following the 1967 Israeli annexation of its territory 
in the Golan Heights. At any opportunity, the Malaysian government would express its 
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support for the return of this territory to Syria. For instance, the Acting Malaysian Permanent 
Representative at the UN, Abdul Halim Ali, stated that, “The legal status of the Golan 
Heights, under international law, therefore remains as an occupied territory and should be 
returned to Syria to whom it belongs” (Abdul Halim Ali, 1982). 
However, at the same time, both countries pursued divergent views and positions on a 
number of international crisis, namely, during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
when Syria had supported the former, while Malaysia had condemned it; as well as during 
the Iran-Iraq War which broke out in 1980, over which Kuala Lumpur remained neutral, 
while Damascus, had supported Iran, mainly as a result of its leadership’s association with 
Tehran’s Shia identity. 
Malaysia-Syria Ties: The Mahathir Era (1981-2003)
It is noteworthy that one of the key determinants of Malaysia’s foreign policy during the 
Mahathir administration, was economy and trade.  Much of Mahathir’s policy was driven 
by the objective of enhancing Malaysia’s economic position – attracting foreign direct 
investments, as well as encouraging Malaysian corporations to venture abroad and seek 
opportunities and invest. Mahathir’s foreign policy could well be described as an economic 
diplomacy as Mahathir had placed the economic factor as a primacy (Nossal and Stubbs, 
1997). 
In addition, the change of leadership in Syria from Hafez Assad to his son Bashar al-Assad 
further enabled relations between Kuala Lumpur and Damascus to improve. According to 
Mahathir, earlier relations with Hafez Assad was formal and the leaders were distant from 
each other. This was partly due to the fact that Hafez was pro-Socialist and considered 
Mahathir as being close to the West. Hence, relations between the two leaders never really 
developed. However, this changed when Bashar al-Assad took over as the President of 
Syria in 2000. Mahathir stated that his relationship with Bashar had been very cordial and 
friendly, and Bashar also had great respect for Mahathir whom he considered as a senior 
statesman (Mahathir, personal communication, April, 5, 2016).
Table 2      































* Less than $50,000
Source: Department of Statistics (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer), various reports.           
  
Table 2 demonstrates that trade between Malaysia and Syria increased when Mahathir 
became the Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981. In 1982 the total trade with Syria was 
MYR14.130 million, and within ten years it increased to MYR51.8 million in 1992. In 
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2003, the figures were at MYR587 million. It is noteworthy that trade relations significantly 
improved when Bashar became the President of Syria in 2000 with total trade with Syria 
registering at MYR256.7 million that year.
During the first phase of Mahathir administration, trade ties between Malaysia and Syria 
also reflected Malaysia’s growing status as a manufacturing and industrial economy. For 
example, bilateral trade was at USD67.3 million (MYR225.74 million) in 2002, with 
Malaysia exporting USD66.3 million worth of goods to Syria, and importing only USD1 
million in return. Malaysia’s main exports to Syria were timber and palm oil, while its 
imports were mainly cotton and herbal medicines from the Republic (New Straits Times, 
August 17, 2003). However, in 2004, Malaysia exported textiles and apparels to Syria to the 
tune of MYR246 million (Malaysia International Trade and Industry, 2006).
                                     
From 1994 onwards, Malaysia started to export palm oil to Syria and this has seen a steady 
increase in volume over the years.  For instance, in 2003, the exports of palm oil accounted 
for 21.2 per cent of total exports to the Middle East region, valued at MYR2 billion (2002: 
MYR1.4 billion), an increase of 40.9 percent, of which Syria (MYR304.1 million) was the 
fourth largest importer, preceded by UAE (MYR460.2 million), Saudi Arabia (MYR360.6 
million) and Iran (MYR317.2 million) (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
2004).  It is interesting to note that Malaysia’s oil conglomerate, Petronas, became part 
of an international consortium in March 1997, concluding an exploration and production 
agreement covering a 5-block exploration area totalling 4,201 sq. km in Northern Syria. 
Petronas held (30 percent), while France’s Elf Aquitaine (40 percent) and Japan’s Sumitomo 
Development Company (30 percent) held the remaining shares (The Middle East and North 
Africa 1998, 1998).
In addition, Mahathir also initiated the entry of Malaysia’s national car Proton to Syria. 
Proton first entered the Syrian market in 2001 through a sole distributorship agreement 
with a local company, Modern Technology Trading Company (MTT). MTT is a subsidiary 
of the Habbal Group of Syria, and Mahathir officiated the opening of its showroom during 
his August 2003 visit to Syria. Proton’s CEO, Tengku Mahaleel Tengku Arif stated that the 
prospect for increasing Proton car sales in Syria was very good, especially with MTT’s plan 
to import the Arena Model (The Star, August 26, 2003). 
It is also interesting to note that the Mahathir administration had also contributed to 
the improvement in areas of political and diplomatic ties. There were two significant 
developments that took place during Mahatir’s administration, namely, the first ever visit by 
a Malaysian Prime Minister to Syria, and second, the opening of the Malaysian embassy in 
Damascus. On 7th August 2003, Mahathir landed at Damascus International Airport, making 
him the first Malaysian leader to have done so. He was accompanied by a 70-member 
delegation, made up of representatives from twenty-two corporations, including Proton, 
Airod, Petronas and various information technology (IT) companies. 
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This was indeed the most significant landmark in Malaysia’s relations with Syria.  The visit 
was to cover “diverse ground from business and regional concerns, to academic dialogues 
with ulamas and think-tanks” (New Straits Times, August 17, 2003). The Malaysian Foreign 
Minister then - Syed Hamid Albar, who accompanied the Prime Minister stated that, “Syria 
was interested in Malaysia’s experience in building a progressive Islamic nation, and 
becoming a middle-income country….  Mahathir and Dr Bashar were also keen to discuss 
regional issues like Palestine and Iraq, which are central to peace in West Asia and the world” 
(ibid). Speaking at a press conference on his trip to Syria, Mahathir said that, “Malaysia is 
willing to ‘open its books’ to enable Syria to learn from its experiences in developing its 
economy and society” (New Straits Times, August 19, 2003).
On regional issues, Malaysia was firm in its stand that both Syria and Lebanon must be part 
of the Middle East peace process as this was necessary for permanent peace in the region. 
Mahathir expressed Malaysia’s hope to see the inclusion of the Golan Heights and Sheba 
farm in the US-brokered road map for Middle East peace (New Straits Times, August 18, 
2003). According to Mahathir, during his bilateral discussion with President Bashar, the 
subject of Golan Heights was discussed in which he reiterated Malaysia’s strong support for 
this occupied territory to be given back to Syria. He also mentioned that Syrians could not 
accept the fact that Golan Heights was being occupied by Israel, but that they could not do 
anything as they (Israel) were supported by the West, (Mahathir, personal communication, 
April, 5, 2016).
On bilateral ties, Mahathir stated, “mutual efforts were being undertaken to enhance ties 
beyond trade to information and communication technology, culture, education, tourism, 
human resource development, youth, sports, oil and gas” (ibid). During the visit, Mahathir 
also visited the famous Ummayad Mosque, which housed a shrine dedicated to one of 
Muslims greatest leaders, Salahudeen Al-Ayubi. After the visit, during the dialogue with 
Syrian Islamic scholars, Mahathir remarked that his perception of Islam had broadened 
because it was clear that “it is the teaching of Islam that we must respect the religions of 
others” (New Straits Times, August 17 2003). 
On a personal note, Mahathir had expressed his affection towards Damascus as a city, in 
particular the souk as well as it being the site of a number of historical places. He was 
particularly impressed by the existence of the Orthodox Church in Damascus, and the 
peaceful coexistence between Christianity and Islam there. Mahathir was impressed and 
mentioned that even Pope John Paul II had visited Syria in May, 2001 (Mahathir, personal 
communication, April, 5, 2016). 
According to a Malaysian news report analysis of Mahathir’s trip to Syria, Damascus had 
considered Malaysia as a role model in terms of her economic success and progressive 
brand of Islam. Syria also wanted to learn how Malaysia had built its economy and 
gained technological know-how. She also expressed interests in Malaysia’s privatisation 
programmes and efforts to join the information age. The visit opened up new levels in 
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bilateral relations between Malaysia and Syria, and contributed hugely in enhancing the 
standing of Malaysia (New Straits Times, August 21, 2003).
It can be said that the Mahathir era saw a shift in diplomatic ties with Syria - from one that 
was purely for the sake of maintaining diplomacy, to one in which there was a concerted 
effort to strengthen ties with Syria for trade and economic purposes. 
Malaysia-Syria Ties during the Inter-Mahathir Era (2003-2018)
(A) Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003 – 2009)
Diplomatic ties
Mahathir stepped down as Prime Minister on 31st October 2003 - two months after returning 
from Damascus, and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia 
replacing Mahathir. During the inter-Mahathir period, much of Mahathir’s economic 
diplomacy with Syria continued to be upheld under the new leadership. An example of this 
economic diplomacy was reflected by the presence of the Malaysian made Proton cars.  In 
January 2009, the fifth Proton model in Syria, the Persona, was launched by its Managing 
Director, Syed Zainal Abidin Syed Mohamed Tahir, and was witnessed by the Malaysian 
Ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammed Ab Halim Ab Rahman. According to Syed Zainal, 
this launch “is expected to boost the national car market’s overall sales in Syria to over 
5,000 units in the next three to five years” (http://auto.bernama.com, January 30, 2009). He 
proceeded to state that Proton had been selling cars in Syria since 2001 and “after Gen-2, 
we are optimistic on how the Syrian market will accept the Persona, which has won many 
customers for being cost-effective with better fuel economy” (ibid).
In May 2004, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong – the King of Malaysia, the Minister of Higher 
Education and the Deputy Minister of Tourism visited Syria.  The visit by the Malaysian 
King was the first ever and His Majesty was given the full honour by the Syrian government. 
His Majesty was hosted by President Bashar Al-Assad, and was conferred Syrian’s finest 
award - the Omayad Decoration. The King reciprocated by bestowing on Bashar, the Darjah 
Utama Seri Mahkota Negara (The Most Exalted Order of the Crown).  The King also 
performed Friday prayers at the famous Omayad Mosque in Damascus. However, it must 
be noted that the visit by the King was more of a symbolic display of the close relations 
between the two countries, and not to establish new areas of economic diplomacy, as the 
King’s role in Malaysia is that of a constitutional monarch.                                  
In February 2007, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became the second Prime Minister of Malaysia 
to visit Syria. Emulating Mahathir, he brought with him a large entourage, including several 
cabinet ministers. Abdullah not only called on his counterpart and other senior officials, but 
he also met with President Bashar and had a private audience with the President followed by 
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a bilateral meeting, which included senior political and government officials, as well as the 
Vice President, Farouq Al-Shara. During the meeting, a number of issues were discussed, 
including problems of the Middle East (New Straits Times, February 27 2007).
                                     
During his official trip to Syria, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, was driven to the Golan Heights, 
some 65 km away from Damascus. Consistent to Malaysia’s official position, he stated, 
“Syria has the right to its claim and it must get the support from the international community. 
Those who hate invasion and respect human rights must support Syria”, and he went further 
to state, “Syria’s role in the Middle East is important and we would like to see peace return 
to the Golan Heights” (New Straits Times, February 28 2007). Like his predecessor, he was 
also critical towards the United States for practising double standards in dealing with the 
Palestinian conflict.                                    
 
Economic ties
It is noteworthy that Abdullah Ahmad Badawi continued the economic diplomacy of 
Mahathir. This was especially evident during his official trip to Syria, where he spoke at a 
business seminar, in which he urged Kuala Lumpur and Damascus to explore opportunities, 
not only for bilateral trade, but in the wider Southeast Asian and West Asian markets which 
held vast potentials for ASEAN and the Arab world. He further stated that he “would like to 
urge both the Malaysian and Syrian business communities to increase their efforts to identify 
opportunities, especially in the context of taking advantage of our respective strengths” (New 
Straits Times, February 27, 2007). He also stressed and said, “I do believe that Malaysia and 
Syria have much to contribute to trade expansion, not only between our two countries but 
also among the Organisation of Islamic Conference member countries as a whole” (ibid). 
At the same seminar, he suggested that Malaysia could be used as a gateway to other Asian 
markets, and added that, “apart from being able to penetrate the ASEAN market, Syrian 
businesses and companies could enter China, Japan and Korea through Kuala Lumpur’s 
strong trade links with the East Asian countries” (ibid).
As a follow-up to Mahathir’s economic diplomacy and in efforts to enhance trade ties 
between the two countries, a Joint Trade Commission was also established.  The first 
meeting of the Joint Trade Commission was held in Kuala Lumpur in July 2007.  The two 
Trade Ministers - Rafidah Aziz for Malaysia and Amer Husni Lutfi for Syria, co-chaired 
the meeting.  During this meeting, both countries also started to explore the possibility 
of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Malaysia’s Trade Minister, Rafidah Aziz, who 
had earlier accompanied the Prime Minister to Syria, said that such an agreement would 
be Syria’s first with an Asian country. She stated that, “The Syrian side proposed that we 
should have FTA study. We agreed that we will have parallel studies and I’m sure a study 
will show the benefits of the FTA” (www.dawn.com, July 04, 2007). However, the FTA idea 
did not see any progress beyond this. A second Joint Trade Commission was held in April 
2011 in Syria, and Malaysia’s then Trade Minister, Mustapa Mohamed, was present with 
his counterpart, Syria’s Minister of Economic and Trade, Lamia Assi. Both parties reviewed 
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trade and investment performances between the two countries. In addition, the Malaysia-
Syria Business Council was established in February 2011 to encourage companies from 
both countries to actively participate in each other’s trade and investment.
Table 3 












Source: Department of Statistics, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer), various reports.
Table 3 demonstrates the impact of economic diplomacy between Malaysia and Syria 
initiated by Mahathir. Trade expanded from MYR588 million in 2003 to MYR618 million 
in 2009. However, in 2010 the trade volume started to decline from MYR618 million (2009) 
to MYR572 million in 2010, and it dropped to the lowest in 2011 to MYR290 million. The 
fall was due to the uprising in Syria beginning March 2011. Various initiatives undertaken 
by Mahathir and Abdullah to enhance bilateral ties could not be implemented or pursued 
due to Syria’s political instability. The conflict in Syria was, and is, the most significant 
factor that had influenced the development of ties from 2011 onwards.
     
(B)  Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (2009 – 2018)
When Najib Abdul Razak took over as the sixth Prime Minister of Malaysia in 2009, his 
administration did not express much interest in enhancing relations with Syria. For Najib, 
the relations with developing world was through multilateral forums such as the United 
Nations, while on the Islamic world, he was more focused on trade ties, namely with the 
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richer Gulf states.  He had also embarked upon establishing security ties with Saudi Arabia, 
namely to fight terrorism. His lack of an Islamic background, unlike Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi, perhaps explained his lack of enthusiasm towards the Islamic world, except at the 
multilateral levels and those based on economic ties. Thus, the Malaysia-Syria relations did 
not experience any significant development during the Najib administration.
     
Humanitarian assistance
Nothing, however, had deterred Malaysia from expressing concerns over the outbreak of 
violence in Syria as demonstrated by her support for the United Nations Security Council’s 
(UNSC) decisions on Syria which called for the cessation of violence and lending of 
humanitarian assistance. In October 2016, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Ahmad Zahid 
Hamidi expressed Malaysia’s outrage when the UN-backed humanitarian convoys near 
Aleppo were attacked during the ongoing 71st UN General Assembly session. According to 
Zahid, “We strongly condemn the killing of unarmed civilians and humanitarian workers in 
that incident as yet another flagrant violation of international law that reflects an absolute 
disrespect, disregard and contempt that the parties to the conflict have for the values of 
humanity” (https://www.nst.com.my, September, 22, 2016).
     
In addition, the Malaysian government also offered to accept at least 3,000 Syrian refugees 
as part of Malaysia’s effort to express its solidarity to the people of Syria. The conflict 
in Syria has caused more than 200,000 people being killed. In August 2014, the United 
Nations declared that there were 6.5 million internally displaced persons in Syria, with 2.9 
million registered refugees outside the country (Sherko Kirmanj, 2014). It should be noted 
that Malaysia was one of the first Muslim countries to accept Syrian refugees, with the first 
batch of refugees arriving in Kuala Lumpur on 11 December, 2015, followed by the second 
batch of 68 Syrian refugees in May 2016. 
The conflict in Syria has also attracted attention from many Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) in Malaysia which have expressed their readiness to provide assistance. Among 
them are the Muslim Volunteer Malaysia (MVM), Global Peace Malaysia, Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia (ABIM) and Mercy Malaysia. It must be noted that a joint NGO - the 
Malaysia Life Line for Syria (MLLFS) was established primarily to provide humanitarian 
support to the people of Syria. Thus far, the MLLFS has organised fundraising events, and 
a humanitarian mission into Syria to supply food and medical supplies (Nurul Izzah, 2017). 
These are part of the people-to-people efforts which exemplify the concerns of Malaysians 
towards the Syrian plight.
Security
It is worth noting that besides diplomatic, economic and humanitarian factors, security is 
another reason why the government of Malaysia is extremely concerned over the conflict 
in Syria. There have been reports of Malaysians going to Syria to join the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh, as it is called in Arabic. “The amount of Malaysian suicide 
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bombers we have witnessed in both Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017 can be described 
as noticeable and is intrinsically the result of the domestic ISIS propaganda campaign in 
Malaysia,” says Tomas Olivier, a counterterrorism and intelligence expert at the Netherlands-
based consultancy firm Twickelerveld Intelligence and Investigations (Maza, 2017).
Recently, the Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu revealed that numerous Malaysian youths 
have been influenced by the Daesh propaganda and were recruited to fight in Syria as 
militants. However, the Minister did not divulge the actual number of Malaysians who were 
in this group. Based on the New Straits Times, hundreds of Malaysian youths were recruited 
by the Islamic State’s (IS) Daesh terror group to fight in Syria as militants, with 37 deaths 
reported (New Straits Times, February 22, 2019).
Conclusion
This article has analysed relations between Malaysia and Syria which was established more 
than 60 years ago (1958-2018). The discussion has revealed the factors that have influenced 
the bilateral relations and impact of Mahathir’s administration on its development. It is 
noteworthy to mention that initial ties were very much confined to diplomatic relations as 
Malaysia then was more interested in establishing relations with Egypt vis-à-vis UAR in 
which Syria was coincidently part of. The friendship was more focused on Egypt rather than 
Syria at that particular time.
One of the challenges faced in the Malaysia-Syria ties was the question of priorities. In the 
pre-Mahathir era, given the lack of resources and as Syria was not perceived as a country 
of immense strategic importance to Kuala Lumpur, bilateral ties between the two countries 
did not really evolve beyond diplomatic relations as bilateral trade was also very limited. 
Even within the Middle East context, Malaysia had her priorities elsewhere and this had 
somewhat affected Malaysia-Syria ties. As far as Malaysia was concerned, Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates and Egypt were her higher priorities than Syria.  In addition, 
Malaysia also had limited resources then - both in terms of manpower and funds, to expand 
its foreign relations. Another, major challenge faced by Malaysia in its bilateral relations 
with Syria was the latter’s political instability. The divergent stance of both countries in 
major international crisis had also affected their relations. Interestingly however, this did 
not sway Malaysia’s support for Syria following Israel’s annexation of the latter’s territory 
in Golan Heights in 1967.
During the Mahathir period, with primacy of economic development, the country’s foreign 
policy took a much more global approach. Malaysia began to open up to the rest of the 
world, driven mainly by economic diplomacy, trying to expand the country’s economic 
reach to different parts of the globe beyond its traditional trading partners. It is worth to 
mention that the change in the leadership in Syria in 2000, and the positive perception by 
Mahathir towards this new political development had also enhanced Malaysia’s bilateral ties 
with Syria. As revealed by Mahathir, personal ties played an important role in the bilateral 
relationship, as Hafez was quite impersonal, whereas his son and successor, Bashar, was very 
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warm and had the personal touch, which greatly influenced the Malaysian Prime Minister’s 
perception of the country (Mahathir, personal communication, April, 5, 2016).
In the inter-Mahathir era, both Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib Abdul Razak had 
moved away from Mahathir’s global foreign policy and instead concentrated on Malaysia’s 
traditional external pillars of ASEAN, while engagement with the Islamic and developing 
worlds was very much multilateral in nature. Emphasis was also very much on ties with 
western powers, namely the United States.
  
In the case of bilateral ties with Syria, Abdullah showed much interests to pursue the 
initiatives laid down by his predecessor as illustrated by his visit to Damascus in 2007. 
Najib, on the other hand, appeared not to have any specific interests in enhancing further 
bilateral ties. In addition, the instability in Syria following the 2011 uprising, has prohibited 
Najib from pursuing any efforts or initiatives he may have towards Syria. It is clear from the 
above discussion that the enhancement of bilateral ties between Malaysia and Syria during 
the inter-Mahathir period was the direct result of Mahathir’s earlier premiership, where he 
started to view the leadership in Syria much more positively.
 
The Malaysia-Syria relations have gone through ups and downs. This article has put together 
all the various factors that determine the bilateral relations. It hopes to contribute to better 
understanding of the Kuala Lumpur-Damascus diplomatic ties. It would be interesting to 
observe and monitor how the new government under the leadership of Mahathir post-14th 
General Election would manage its relations with Syria. Will Malaysia under Mahathir’s 
second phase of premiership rejuvenate its economic diplomacy with Syria? Several factors 
have changed however, since Mahathir left office in 2003 after his first stint as the Prime 
Minister. Notably, political and security situations in Syria have deteriorated and it is no 
longer as safe as it used to be in the early 2000s.  The way forward in Malaysia-Syria 
relations would, arguably and inevitably, be shaped by the development in Syria.
  
It is worth mentioning that during the Najib administration, the then government opposition, 
had, inter alia, expressed their urge for the government to “condemn Bashar Al-Assad’s 
regime of terror in Syria” and to “set up a parliamentary caucus on (the) Syrian crisis” (Nurul 
Izzah, 2017). However, 17 months after winning the General Elections over Najib’s Barisan 
Nasional government in May, 2018 – the “New Malaysia” government under Mahathir has 
yet to issue its official stance on the Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. This, should it be realized, 
would undeniably shape the path and the form Malaysia-Syria relations would take in the 
coming years whatever the outcome of the Syrian crisis would be.
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